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Non-State Actors and Change in Foreign Policy: The case of a Self-Determination Referendum in the KRI





This article bridges the gap between referenda and foreign policy, emphasising the role of non-state entities as (f) actors of change in the formulation of foreign policy. Using a multi-layered (rather than a normative) analysis, it examines the Kurdistan Region of Iraq as a novel, non-state case in the International Relations and foreign policy analysis literature. It argues that referenda can be pursued by non-state entities, not just state actors, and analyses the parameters of the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) unilateral declaration and conduct of the 2017 referendum. It perceives referenda as tools for the formulation and possible facilitation of foreign policy objectives and in particular, claims to the formation of statehood undertaken by a non-state entity. The study, therefore, pursues a multi-level analysis looking at the contributing dynamics at the domestic, regional and international levels that demonstrate the impact of referenda on foreign policy-making and examines the catalyst role of the unit level that stands out as a determining factor.











‘Every man’s right is recognised to be consulted about the affairs of the political unit to which he belongs; he may be assumed to have an equal right to be consulted about the form and extent of the unit’
(Carr, 1942:39, Qvortrup, 2014:16)

This work examines referenda (and their aims) in relation to foreign policy and analyses their role in foreign policy making through the case of the 25th September Referendum in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). This topical case is particularly interesting as it demonstrates that referenda can be linked to foreign policy and also pursued by non-state entities. Moreover, it shows that a multi-layered analysis, focused on the behaviour of a specific non-state actor, namely the KRI, is also possible beyond traditional approaches confined to the analysis of referenda predominantly as state policies. Thus, the referendum has not only played an important role in the facilitation of the KRI’s foreign policy agenda – given the internationalisation of the matter with local, regional and international actors explicitly involved – but it has also impacted on the formulation of the foreign policies of those actors who took, by and large, a clear stance against it. Furthermore, the use of referenda by non-state actors as a policy-making means indicates changes in the ontology of referenda that has been now expanded to include those entities’ direct effect as (f)actors of change. The relevant literature (Paul, 2018: 177) perceives referenda as a factor of change per se.​[1]​ Thus, this particular case is notable when associated with the state-centric ontology of IR: it demonstrates how a non-state actor can pursue and use referenda as a tool to exert internal pressure (vis-à-vis the central government) within a federal context, but more importantly to exert pressure on external actors as a means to consolidate status. Often referenda aim at raising public support in order to release internal/external pressure and overcome obstacles to the implementation of policies, thus a degree of political risk is typically inherent.  Similarly, this approach – framed within the Kurdish context – becomes more interesting due to the Iraqi federal form of governance which raises further challenges and complications. 
This article then approaches referenda as tools to formulate and possibly facilitate broader (economic and) foreign policy objectives. In this case, the referendum is directly linked to the KRG’s foreign policy goals – that is the quest for statehood (under any form or type) in continuation of the 1992 autonomy recognition. Indeed, the Kurdistan Region’s (KR) referendum has been a tool for the consolidation of public consensus that was important for the implementation of the foreign policy objective to achieve external support and thus acquire leverage to negotiate with the central government (Akreyi, 2018: 26) for the implementation of a new sort of independence. Another factor that motivated the KRG decision to undertake this referendum – as part of its broader foreign policy objectives – was also the will to create a new constitution. The non-implementation of certain key provisions of the existing constitution and the Kurdish policy to re-negotiate its status, were both dynamics heavily in play. This is alongside the often overlooked reality that the announcement of the referendum was an application of a postponed decision that dates back to 2014 and was interrupted by the threat of the Islamic State (IS) (Rafaat, 2018:226).​[2]​ Undoubtedly, the act of the referendum per se constitutes an attempt to shift from being recognised as de facto to de jure state, that would entail further institutionalisation – particularly as the KRG exercises control over a territory and over a permanent population, and has demonstrated capacity to enter into relations with other state actors, which is the criteria for the Montevideo Convention on Statehood (1933).
The paper bridges the relationship between referenda and foreign policy analysis and attempts to shed light on those factors that stand out in all three different levels (domestic, regional and international) from a foreign policy analysis perspective (Voltolini, 2016: 1503). Theoretically, the article addresses a) how referenda inform foreign policy making; b) how non-state actors can use referenda to bring change in IR​[3]​ (Stengel and Baumann, 2017: 1) and c) how ‘effectively, we may think of change from different levels of analysis and focal points’ (Paul, 2018: 183). Empirically, the work analyses the KRG’s unilateral declaration and conduct of the 25th September referendum – that involved neither the UN nor any other institution – as a landmark for regional politics following the change in Iraq (2003). This case study contributes to the understanding of the link between referenda and foreign policy analysis – as well as opening up a new chapter in current debates regarding referenda undertaken by non-state actors. It thus pursues a novel approach that looks at the nexus between foreign policy and referenda, especially in the context of the Middle East, where the case of referenda in the implementation of foreign policy has been limited compared to the European continent where it has recently witnessed an increase in practice (Giusti, 2016). Specifically, it highlights the contributing role of a non-state actor found at a proto-state stage. The KRG’s objective to legitimise further its own policies and transition from one status to another through the tool of a referendum is central to this analysis. Such typology of non-state entities that satisfy the criteria for statehood exercising a referendum is a relatively under-examined topic in its own right.
Scholarly work has typically focused on referenda as a process or has examined issues of legality from an international law perspective (Grant, 2018), but since the beginning of the implementation of the Iraqi constitution there have been a series of breaches that create a catch “twenty-two” situation and present further analytical complications. This has been discussed in recent works addressing the failures of federalism as a motive behind the realisation of the 25th September Kurdish referendum (Akreyi, 2018: 17, 18).​[4]​ Beyond prevalent approaches, including theories of democracy (Qvortrup, 2012) and discussions addressing the inter-relation of referenda and border-related conflict (which is not the case here)​[5]​ (Qvortrup, 2014: 95) or more recently with the war against IS (Holland-McCowan, 2018), this study considers referenda a political act and, as such, it will be analysed through the prism of foreign policy analysis. This study does not analyse individual reactions, either of regional or international actors, but looks at the referendum as a determinant in the formulation of foreign policy making.
Methodologically, the study relies on field work research along with the literature on referenda as scholarly work on the latter’s link with foreign policy analysis is limited. Thus, semi-structured interviews with the protagonists of the referendum and other key political actors involved constitute this work’s primary sources. As such they appear of critical importance for a comprehensive understanding of the role of different foreign policy layers, including the most important determinant(s) that emerge in each level, and how these interact with each other analysed below. I also insert as an appendix the official document (in its original language) of the Presidential Resolution 106 that declared the referendum. 
The role of Referenda in Foreign Policy in the literature: A theoretical assessment 
Referenda, considered an explicit and direct assertion of democracy, are currently increasing in number and tending towards becoming common practice, as the cases of Scotland (Walker, 2014), Britain, Greece, Italy and others have demonstrated (Morel and Qvortrup, 2017). Hitherto, studies have been conducted on the interrelation between law and referenda or referenda and its policy-determining processes (Hobolt, 2009: 7). Indeed, the mainstream literature concentrates on the relation between democracy (and its theories) and the referendum process e.g. aspects of the election code (Safta, 2014: 56-59); historical accounts​[6]​ (Qvortrup: 2015); issues of typology, and legitimacy or any functional operations (Talvikki, 1997: 15). Referenda have been also perceived as instruments of secession (Hudson, 2009: 221-235). The diversity of referenda, along with the meanings they convey, stipulates the different shapes and forms that referenda can take as well as the different norms by which these are governed based on their contextualization (Hobolt, 2009:1). Referenda can be divided into different kinds depending on the nature concerned: namely, a passed law; a matter of national interest (i.e. Greek case); the form of government; constitutional changes (i.e. France); treaty ratifications and the like. Indeed, referenda have been particularly evident today as a popular means of policy making, especially in the European context, where they seem to have become a trend, in contrast to lesser occurrences in the Middle Eastern region. It becomes clear then that, since each case is different, the aim here is not to pursue a comparative study based on the application of this process. Instead, and beyond the typology of the referenda (e.g. passive/rejective referendum which resembles that of the KRG’s in terms of the decision maker) ​[7]​  (Talvikki, 1997: 123) there is no such a thing as ‘a general theory of the referendum’ (Smith, 1976: 277). Thus, Safta’s (2014) link of the consultative referendum to questions of national interest according to which these are taking place upon request by the President and as such are contextualised in certain examples, demonstrate the variation of the referenda into typologies (Safta, 2014: 56-59). Since there is no certain process and the referendum is ‘one way to exercise national sovereignty’ the case of the KRI fits very well within the theoretical context.  For example, ‘in Romanian Law on the organisation and holding of the referendum (No.341/2013) the implementation of the referendum takes place a year after it has been published in the Official Gazette’ (Safta, 2014:57). Further typology of referenda stems out of cases ‘when solutions to ethnic and national issues and conflicts are sought through referenda’ (Qvortrup, 2014).​[8]​ Theory here explains the relation between the management of ethnic or national differences and referenda as a tool through which the former could be solved. The referendum has been also used ‘as a tool for the consolidation of public consensus’ as was presented to be the case with Taiwan (Bedford and Hwang, 2006: 73).​[9]​ In the case of the Middle East, especially following the 2003 Iraq War, political nationalism has been empowered by a series of dynamics, such as fragile sovereignty or the multi ethnic identity of the different communities that co-exist in a single state comprising the nation-state. This situation imposes further challenges to the management of a referendum in a federal context. The literature on federalism discusses ‘preventing or resolving deeply divided societies while maintaining the territorial integrity of existing states’ (Anderson, 2007: 160). A helpful finding borrowed from this field of study – the connection between conflict and federalism or federalism and self-rule – reveals that a critical factor is the action-reaction argument (that is, the actors’ reactions to the acting actor). According to Anderson, ‘federalism seems to both facilitate and prevent secessionist conflict’.​[10]​ The same author argues that ‘there has not been nearly enough work done to situate the debate regarding federalism’ (Anderson, 2007: 159). More interesting still, as stated by Cameron, is that ‘it seems reasonable to conclude that the likelihood of there being a secession movement in a given polity turns more on how people are treated than on whether or not they are federally governed’ (Cameron, 2009:319). Similarly, if power sharing is not distributed evenly this might justify a concentration of power in the centre (Anderson, 2007: 166).​[11]​ It seems then that the typology of referenda looks much the same as the nature of federalism. According to Anderson ‘there are as many federalisms as there are federations’ (Anderson, 2007: 160) and ‘federalism…can contribute to and legitimize secession as a viable policy option’ (Anderson, 2007: 161). This is an interesting point that will be elaborated further through the different dynamics that comprise each level of analysis as ‘whether federalism is a problem or a solution depends a great deal on factors that are external to –and, indeed, deeper than – the design of federalism itself’ (Erk and Anderson, 2009: 201).
However, what has been underexamined by the current literature is the pursuit of referenda by non-state actors and their approach from a foreign policy analysis perspective. Non-state actors as agents of referenda have been perceived and analysed in relation to ‘business or public interests’ within EU’s context of integration and how the latter ‘influences domestic non-state actors in different ways’ (Saurugger, 2007: 1093). In this case the focus is on how the context shapes these actors’ transformation and the influence of the (Europeanisation) process on them rather than vice-versa. Although scholarly work has concentrated mainly on international institutions and organisations in addition to studies on NGOs, these have been presented as contributing factors to the policy making rather than agents of referenda (Saurugger, 2007:1514). Thus, what has not been done so far is to identify that a typology of non-state entities can act as agents of policy making through the conduct of referenda and, in particular, the states-to-be. Existing theories of foreign policy analysis focus primarily on the role of the state (e.g. 1905 Norway’s vote for independence from Sweden and the union established in 1814) and its characteristics or the nature of the system and its norms, whereas ontologically this paper deals with the role of a non-state entity – a relatively new phenomenon in the literature of referenda. In the European context, the 1-O Catalan independence referendum (2017) is illuminatingly indicative of how regions can act as factors in the formulation of foreign policy making (Martí and Cetrà, 2016: 107-108,119).​[12]​
The emergence of the KRI  has had a twofold impact: on the one hand the KRI constitutes a foreign policy making actor in its own right, and on the other hand, it has acted as a factor of change in the formulation of regional and international foreign policies (along with domestic effects). Therefore, the paper is divided into three layers in order to examine the different dynamics at the domestic, regional and international levels of the 25th September KRI referendum along with its consequences in the post and ante 16th October period (Charountaki, 37-38: 2018).​[13]​ Scholarly work in this field appears limited to observation or policy reports (Park, Jongerden, Owtram, Yoshioka: 2017).​[14]​ 
A multi-level Analysis in Chronological Order
The question of independence moved from being an abstract discussion…centered around Kurdish rights…to a process…focused on the Kurdish sovereignty’
(Dalay, 2017: 6)
The case of the KRI, a de jure non-state entity, operates within a federal system of governance that is ‘a sharing of sovereignty between two levels’, the Kurdistan Region (KR) and Baghdad (Heywood, 1999: 94). In the case of the KRI, the term ‘state’ is understood to ‘refer to a territorial space’(Heywood, 1999: 74) that enjoys internal and external sovereignty to a considerable extent given the rising interdependence of the regional and international relations system as well as a de facto political and national sovereignty. This reflects Heywood’s assertion that, ‘external sovereignty can be respected’ even if ‘internal sovereignty may be a matter of dispute’ (Heywood, 1999: 95). This is a common phenomenon in the Middle Eastern context due to its multi-ethnic societies, as notions of authority and power are precarious and often violated whilst inter dependence has taken over. 
The use of referenda is not a new notion in the Iraqi context; it has been mentioned repeatedly in the Iraqi constitution (article 115; article 127; article 139) for different occasions with the most important being the referendum on the draft constitution (15 October 2005 postponed for 2007) provisioned by Article 30 of the Transitional Administrative Law of the State of Iraq. It has been noted that in the Iraqi context there are many different ad hoc cases rather than a law applied in general. Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law (2004), that became later article 140, also provided for ‘normalization’, a census, and a referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories no later than 31st  December 2007 (article 140 of the Constitution of Iraq) (Rudaw, 2019)​[15]​ (Omar, 2018).
The KRG referendum gave birth to two conflicting schools of thought: the advocates of self-determination based their argument on the notion that ‘an independent Kurdistan can serve as a buffer zone between Iran on the East and an increasingly unstable Turkey on the North; whereas also [sheltering] minorities under the KRG’ (Franks, 2017: 6). At the same time, others argued the referendum would ‘threaten the fragile stability of the region’ (Wilson, 2017: 7). This article makes a shift towards a multi-level approach to explain determinants that link the referendum to foreign policy making (in the case of the KRI). The interaction of the various factors on different levels of analysis demonstrates how intertwined the factors are at unit, state and systemic levels.

The three levels of foreign policy analysis: an application to the KRI
A series of domestic events, such as financial problems following the central government’s policy to cut the budget since 2014; the fight against IS and the lack of real support to the KRG; in addition to Kurdish claims to rights that were not addressed and Baghdad’s act to send ministers back to Kurdistan, can be traced in the lead up to the 2017 referendum (Rasul, 2018). Most significantly, the central government’s unilateral initiative to form the Kirkuk-based Dijla Operations Command Centre in December 2012 and the unilateral deployment of forces south of Kirkuk (along with long range artillery) (MENA Report, 2012) has arguably played a catalyst role, affecting the third level of analysis vis-à-vis its impact on the systemic (apart from the regional) environment and its constituents’ stance (Fantappie, 2013).  Internally, the importance of the disputed land (namely the areas of Kirkuk, Shingal and Khanaqin) stands out as a factor on its own right (Omar, 2018).​[16]​ One of the key problems from Baghdad’s perspective was that the September 25 referendum was held in the disputed territories. Thus, the KRG’s control of the disputed areas in the aftermath of the Iraqi army’s withdrawal to a great extent resulted in the non-implementation of the referendum’s outcome and further developments, explored in greater detail below. According to General Najat Ali, ‘the US strategy in disputed areas and particularly in Kirkuk is neither side to have the control as its administration should be comprised by all elements’ (Najat Ali, 2017).  On 7th June, 2017 the Presidential initiative (Chulove and Hawrami, 2014)​[17]​ was agreed with the majority of the political parties and later passed through the parliament (Abdullah, 2018:12).​[18]​ Following this meeting, the Regional Order, Resolution 106 (see Appendix), decreed on 8th June, 2017 was announced. This decision was based on the violation of the successive articles in the Iraqi constitution that guaranteed Kurdish rights. The Declaration of Referendum (No.369) issued by the Presidential office provisioned the referendum to be held in the KR, including the Kurdistani (disputed) areas out of the KRG administration. According to No.10 of the Resolution ‘the government institutions and political parties have no right to interfere in anyway in the process of the organisation of the referendum’ (Appendix). Even though Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al Abadi had recognized in August 2016 ‘self-determination as an undisputed right’ (Yakis, 2017) the referendum was eventually marked as untimely by the majority of regional (MENA Report, 2017)​[19]​ and international players including Baghdad – with the Iraqi federal court ruling (20th November, 2017) that the result of the 25th September referendum was null and void. The latter illustrates the importance of the ‘action-reaction’ argument. The central government’s policies at that time appear related to the withdrawal of the US forces from Iraq (2011) and the resulting political power vacuum. 
The year 2014 – a transitional period for Iraq​[20]​ – was a turning point chronologically because of the rise of an unexpected threat, namely the Islamic State (IS, a non-state actor of fundamentalist religious orientation), also operating in the KRI heralding a watershed in regional politics. 
Moreover, on the regional level, the role of IS in the postponement of the KRG’s planned 2014 referendum, following Baghdad’s decision to cut off all federal revenues to the KRI in January 2014, thus further exacerbating Erbil-Baghdad relations, has proved determining (Barzani, 2017).​[21]​ Among others and in line with the literature, I distinguish the role of Iran as detrimental in the cancellation of the referendum’s results and a key player in the determination of the outcome of the referendum’s implementation (Akreyi, 2018: 27).​[22]​ From October, 15th 2017 forces were gradually built up in Kirkuk. According to Masoud Barzani Hashd Al Shaabi along with representatives of the Iranian IRGC were present together with the Iraqi army in Kirkuk (Barzani, 2018).

The decision to hold the 25th September, 2017 referendum was not a new proposal but a decision that dates back to 1st July, 2014 when the KR’s President announced his intention to call for a referendum on the grounds that Iraq was de facto partitioned; this decision was initially postponed to October 2016, then postponed by the KRG a second time until after the operation to liberate Mosul from IS (Barzani, 2016). In fact, the KRG’s Independent High Election and Referendum Commission (IHERC) was established back in 2014 (KRG Law, article 4, 2014) according to the Iraqi Constitution (KNA Law No1, 1992) to facilitate the referendum (Adil, 2017).​[23]​ The Kurdistan Parliament (KP), which reconvened for the first time since October 2015, passed a resolution on 15th September, 2017 which supported the 25th September, 2017 referendum (Jalabi, 2017). This resolution was responded to with two further resolutions, passed by the Iraqi parliament; one empowering al-Abadi to take all necessary measures to prevent the referendum, and another to fire Kirkuk’s governor, Najmaldin Karim, for supporting Kirkuk’s provincial council’s decision to take part in the referendum (Rasheed and Jalabi, 2017). 

On the international level the behaviour of the international community, and particularly the US, stands out. According to Masoud Barzani, and even though discussions pre-dated the referendum, ‘the idea of the referendum and the thoughts were positive…[however] ‘they [US] thought we were using it as bluffing card and the last minute we would change our mind’. The former President stated that the US intentions were not clear and ‘in the draft letter that was brought to us – mid-September by the former US Secretary of State Tillerson – we needed assurances… instead of “respect” we wanted the word “support”’ (Barzani, 2017). The regional and international stances reflected ‘the policy of supporting one Iraq’ and according to others ‘the US objective to restore Iraqi authority to Kirkuk’ (Zucchino and Schmitt, 2017). 

However, the non-implementation of the KRI’s referendum results did not alter the KRG’s direct relations with both the international and regional powers. This was further reaffirmed, for example, by the KRG – Iran’s commitment to long term economic relations, with the current bilateral trade totalling around $6.5 billion annually. This led to the reopening of the Parwezkhan border crossing with Iran, which boosted a free trade zone (Ali, 2018).​[24]​ ‘A 650-million-dollar worth industrial city on the Iranian side of the Parwezkhan Border crossing’ further developed bilateral ties (Tawfiq, 2018).  The US allocation of $365 million for the Peshmerga forces under the United States’ 2018 defence bill was indicative of the linear US policies concerning the strategic level of the US-Kurdish relations. Likewise, the visit of the US Secretary of Energy Rick Perry to the KRI a year after the Kurdish referendum to ‘express the US interest to invest in the semi-autonomous KR…and the view that the KR is important [therefore] the US is interested in working [also] with [Erbil] in the sector of energy and natural resources’ is indicative (Ali, 2018). In the same context, we find constant meetings for instance between the Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi and the Kurdish Premiership in February 2019 (Rudaw, 2019) or the more recent visit of the Iraqi parliament speaker in the KR (Kurdistan 24, 2019). 
The successful rebuilding of the KRG’s diplomatic ties with neighbours and foreign countries in the aftermath of the 25th September Kurdish referendum was also reaffirmed by the former KR President, Masoud Barzani (Barzani, 2018). At the same time, ‘French President Macron reconnected the KRG to the international community’. Similarly, ‘Russian-KRG relations have not changed as well… they had five oil and gas exploration and development blocks and they continue to do so’. Finally, the ‘referendum has [not] only changed our priorities but has given us reason to further our reforms’ (Talabani, 2017). It is thus understood that there is continuation in the external or regional policies toward the KRG, whilst these were ‘paused during the referendum’; they soon ‘started again the training and reforms program by the Coalition for the ministry of the peshmerga affairs’, for instance the German presence in the KRI and the ‘continuation of their support’ (Najat Ali, 2017).
Ideational structures and cognitive biases continue to play equal roles in the process of the formulation of the referendum’s outcome for the implementation of the KR’s foreign policy. Domestic parameters such as the impact of (mis)information and other perceptions constitute a further determinant. Internally, (mis)perceptions and assumptions comprised, for instance, of ‘PUK (Kurdistan Patriotic Union) leadership’s handling of misinformation to Baghdad that there was no support and none of the political parties supported this but instead it is a pressure card that won’t succeed’ (Barzani, 2017). Iraqi perceptions are also noted by the KRG deputy Prime Minister according to whom ‘Iraq thought they would lead the KR through its separation into provinces’ (rather than a united entity) (Talabani, 2017).  At the same time the opposition’s policies, founded on an anti-Barzani rhetoric and a logic of not supporting anything considered as a Barzani project (Najat Ali, 2017), demonstrated the internal divide on the basis of which were constructed the evolution of domestic reactions to the outcome of the referendum. According to Kosrat Rasul, ‘back in September 22nd the Kurds were divided between for and against the referendum’ (Rasul, 2018) whereas it is argued that ‘the US would intervene with whoever started the conflict first’ following the tension (16 October 2019) that the post referendum months created (Rasul, 2018).

Likewise, of critical importance is the role of the material structures as a determinant of change that affected the KRG policy. In specific, the (expected) event on 16 October 2017​[25]​ changed the equilibrium of power (Sinjari, 2017). ‘[Kurdish] withdrawal from the frontline opened the way to encircle the Kurdish forces’ following ‘a plan of PUK individuals’ (Rasul, 2018).​[26]​ The successive victories against IS between 2014 and 2017 boosted Kurdish morale: ‘[Our] morale was high due to the fight against IS (following the Iraqi army fleeing in 2014); the control of all the disputed areas including Kirkuk (until October 20th 2017) and [the belief that] Iraq would never be in position to fight the peshmerga’ (Rasul, 2018). ‘The army held the key oil fields: Bai Hassan and Avana (280,000 b/d) including Sinjar’ (Tom DiChristopher (​https:​/​​/​www.cnbc.com​/​tom-dichristopher​/​" \o "" \t "​), 2017). Their international recognition as liberators following their successive victories against IS made the Kurds an integral part of the global anti-IS coalition; it also gave the Kurds the impression that they would be rewarded with the implementation of the referendum’s result.
Above all, the reluctance of the central government to recognize the referendum’s result and by extension the non-engagement in any kind of dialogue as far as the referendum’s outcome per se (along with plans to control Erbil) (Barzani, 2017) laid the foundation for the 16th October events.​[27]​ Internal matters, for instance, ‘the fact that Iraq wanted elections [also] affected the referendum’s outcome (Najat Ali, 2017). Either ‘an act of treason’ (Barzani, 2017) (vis-à-vis the actions of a certain circle from PUK supported by the Iraqi army against the implementation of the independence project) or ‘revenge’ (Rasul, 2018),​[28]​ the 16th October is again directly linked to the pending status of the disputed areas in Iraq – a critical factor in need of further analysis in its own right. 
The control of the oil rich Kirkuk has been critical in the developments as far as the implementation of the referendum’s results is concerned. Najat Ali states that the status of Kirkuk is ‘a status that does not want to be clarified’ (Najat Ali, 2017). According to the former KR President, ‘Kirkuk was handed over to the Iraqis’ (Barzani, 2018). The tipping point was most likely that the referendum took place in the disputed areas, which by then were under the military control of the KRG, having been liberated from IS. According to Masoud Barzani, ‘such events would have occurred even without the referendum’ vis-à-vis the postponement of the Hawija offensive (Barzani, 2017). ‘Even if the referendum was not held, there was a plan to attack Kurdistani areas and destabilise the situation in the KR’ (Rudaw, 2017). Despite warnings from Baghdad, Barzani (December 2016) insisted that ‘we have a deal with America, between the Pentagon and the Peshmerga ministry – and with the Iraqi government – that the defence lines before the Mosul operation are non-negotiable’ (Rudaw, 2017). ‘During our meetings with McGurk, he even said himself that it is a matter that parties in the Kurdistan Region should decide’ and that ‘the US envoy had [not] urged that upcoming regional elections be postponed’ (Ali, 2018).  KRG would help Baghdad retake Mosul and no militias - Hash-Al Shaabi forces - would be used in disputed areas (Sinjari, 2017). Kosrat Rasoul argues that the ‘2016 agreement confirmed the implementation of article 140’ (Rasul, 2018). In fact, according to Masoud Barzani, ‘I asked the US defence Secretary Ashton Carter – what if Iraq would not stick to the Agreement? The US replied that we will guarantee and make sure of that. The US did not keep their promises and Iraqis violated the agreement. Instead the peshmerga were rewarded by an attack’ (Barzani, 2017).

This illustrates how the October 2016 Baghdad-KRG agreement, reached under US auspices, constitutes an instrument of foreign policy and is indicative of the central government’s intentions, as well as the impact that the domestic level of analysis in the formulation of the KRG’s foreign policy had, as far as the implication of the referendum’s results is concerned.  It is thus interesting that a nodal point of the domestic dynamics has been the 17th October, 2016 Agreement, just a year before the 16th October events. It is also interesting that this agreement constitutes a factor the breach of which led to the 16th October events. This sequence of change demonstrates the extent of the inter-relatedness that developments have in this case and how the September referendum accelerated rather than created the outcome. This was a bilateral KRG-Baghdad agreement, made with US support, provisioning the plan for coordinating the liberation of Mosul and the central government would also not deploy PMF (Popular Mobilization Forces) to areas bordering the KR (Najat Ali, 2017).  According to Qubad Talabani, and following the Mosul operation, it was agreed that, the peshmerga forces would remain to territories – including the disputed areas – lost as a result of the 16th October events which they had held before the agreement (Talabani, 2017). If such assertions were accurate the KR’s referendum could also be considered (domestically) as a defence of political sovereignty given the sequence of events that reached an apex by 16th October. The referendum can be also perceived as the outcome of the KRG’s pre-emptive action to deal with the repercussions that increasing regional and international interference in the KR might have had. The rapidly increasing interest from regional actors is well-illustrated by the gradually expanding presence of the Iraqi militias in internal politics: the imminent repercussions of the increasing interference of militias and, in particular, the presence of Hash-Al Shaabi​[29]​ (KRSC, 2017) in Mosul, Tel Afar or even later in Kirkuk (16 October 2017) (Barzani, 2017)​[30]​ are indicative (Sinjari, 2017). Indeed ‘Hash-Al Shaabi and Hezbollah did take part in the 16th October events’ (Barzani, 2017). 
The status of the disputed areas, which is a determinant in its own right, is also interlinked with the non-implementation of article 140 ‘that set out a clear mechanism to determine the status of the disputed areas’; this has been the main source of discord between Baghdad and Erbil since the 2010 Erbil Agreement (MENA Report, 2012). This transfer of power from central to local can have further repercussions on decision making policy. Thus, the referendum did not aim to draw the border in Kurdistan but establish a new constitution vis-à-vis the Masoud Barzani’s proposal for a Federal Kurdistani State provisioned for the special status of the disputed areas (Barzani, 2017).  According to the Kurdish stance, ‘one of the points has been to create a new Kurdistan Constitution based on the model of federalism along with the normalisation of the administrative demography and boundaries – especially in the case of Kirkuk (meant to be implemented by article 140)’ (Masrour, 2017). This has been consistent with the referendum’s discourse that “we [Kurds] do not compromise on the Kurdistani identity of Kirkuk” (Barzani, 2018) and the use of specific terminology through the reference to ‘Kurdistani’ area and polity (O’Leary, McGarry and Salih, 22: 2005).​[31]​ This term is also linked to a geographical definition of the polity as it has been similarly the case with the connotation of the KR, which refers to a specific territory. Thus, the KR, in an attempt to further consolidate its power and institutionalise its foreign policy process along with the aim to upgrade its status, linked the referendum to foreign policy through the notion of the creation of a new constitution following the deteriorating relations with Baghdad from 2014 until recently. 
At this stage, a series of interesting conclusions could be drawn: (Unilateral) referenda can be decided by the Presidency even in a non-state context and specifically within federalisms. The consent and will of central government, related to the reaction to the act of referendum, is of high importance. This has been clearly demonstrated in the case of the decision making process of the self-determination referendum in Southern Sudan (January 2011). The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA, 2005) between the government and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement in Naivasha (Kenya) relied heavily on the central government’s consensus for the acknowledgement of the outcome of the referendum that is the recognition of South Sudan’s right to statehood on 9th July, 2011. Despite regional reactions (namely Libyan, Egyptian and Saudi), the international factor – namely, the US and President Obama himself – ‘warned publicly the Sudanese at the UN to allow a credible vote’ and ‘not to disrupt a coming referendum that is likely to result in partition’(Landler, 2010: A9). The US reached the point of ‘extended sanctions against Sudan on 1st November, 2010 in order to pressure the government to stick to the referendum deadline’ (Brunn, 2015: 3524) though this had not been their consistent stance. Only from 1997 onward did the Sudanese government formally accept the Khartoum Peace Agreement (Carter Center Report, 2018). The ousted Sudanese President affirmed that ‘the stability of the south is very important [as this has] an impact on the north’ even if problems would not be solved (Bashir, 2011). Omar al-Bashir (​https:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Omar_al-Bashir" \o "Omar al-Bashir​), back then, affirmed ‘the southern region’s right to secede’ and that the ‘referendum was helpful because unity could not be forced by power’ (Qvortrup, 2014:50). 
Finally, ‘the lack of a united view’ regarding the referendum and ‘Kurdish divisions prior to 25th September for and against the referendum’ – even within the same Kurdish party – proved to be the Trojan horse as a determinant that dictated the aftermath of the Kurdish referendum (Rasul, 2018). The historical conflict among Iraq’s Kurds has been also the same factor that has thwarted a united political stand towards the common goal, even in the 21st century. This is directly linked to the division of the Kurdish army into two wings (while current efforts towards a consistent process of institutionalisation appear promising) that was bridged during the war against IS.

The Kurdish Referendum: The Unit Level Analysis
Notions of Leadership Versus the Group of Leadership
Despite the demonstrable significance of factors at all levels for decision making and agency in the aftermath of the referendum, the role of the unit level has visible importance – both in terms of implementation and its disregard for the Iraqi stance that the referendum: ‘is unconstitutional under article109’ (Husain, 2017). In the case under examination, it is surprising how both the domestic and the unit level of analysis stand out as factors of change. According to the literature, ‘by bringing in domestic and individual-level factors as intervening variables and structural modifiers neoclassical realism has made an advancement’, at least in the study of changes in foreign policy behaviour (Paul, 2018: 178).
The importance of this level of analysis stands out both in the case of the referendum’s decision-making (decided by the KR President) but also in the case of its impediment initiated mainly by leaders of the opposition (a fragmented PUK – Patriotic Union of Kurdistan – leadership of different individuals). The way this latter group operated demonstrates its interaction with regional and international influences, using military means to solve a political dispute; their modus operandi also highlights the critical weight of individuals in the policy making process. The former KR President reflected about these interactions that ‘it is very sad to have seen certain elements in PUK planned with Iran and Iraq to blame PUK peshmerga’, and also that ‘PUK was giving information to Baghdad that there was no support and none of the political parties supported this but instead it is a pressure card that won’t succeed’ (Barzani, 2017). Here biases stemming from an overconfident conclusion that the referendum did not have strong opponents resulted in surprising events – most notably that decisions made on 16th October, 2017 had severe domestic, regional and international implications given the deterioration of the Iraqi political landscape as a whole. The former President’s stance was that ‘we had taken all possibilities into consideration and prepared for all events but one thing not taken into account: internal forces to help Hashd al-Shaabi to encircle the area. This was not even thought of’ (Barzani, 2017). This indicates that the aforementioned biases meant that discourse focused on the objective to ‘establish an independent Kurdistan’ (Barzani, 2016).
Thus, the role of the leadership on the domestic level has been an undisputed determinant that has shaped Iraqi politics for past decades. In the Kurdish case, all three types of the Weberian typology were demonstrated by the former Presidency, whose power was derived from his post but more importantly his historical background and the power of his own personality and determination to achieve certain goals throughout his tenure of office (Szelenyi, 2015).​[32]​ The onset of the post-cold war period had already marked for Iraq the transition into a new mode of federal governance and within this context the emergence of the KRI that has enjoyed a considerable degree of de facto independence. Within this same context, it is not surprising that leadership notions and cognitive factors have played a central role in the decision making of the 25th September, 2017 referendum (Alden and Aran, 2017:7).​[33]​




This work demonstrates how the example of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq can further enrich the debate over the use and impact (both internally but also externally) of referenda undertaken by non-state entities on foreign policy. Two important arguments were raised: that non-state actors can operate as agents of referenda that can, in turn, constitute factors of change –  to implement their policies. Secondly, the Kurdish referendum aimed at the institutionalisation of the KRG’s foreign policy process through a change in the constitution that was thought to further consolidate and strengthen its status including foreign relations. In this same context, the KR’s referendum formed the orientation of regional and international foreign policies explicitly. Through a multi-level analysis I delineated the impact of the unit level as a determinant that affected the implementation process of the referendum’s result and how this affected the KRG foreign policy making. This level of analysis is interesting not only because of the referendum’s decision primarily by the KR’s Presidency but also because the unit level of analysis is linked here to the catalyst role of a group of (fragmented) leaders that belong to the opposition in the referendum’s non-implementation.  This group of individuals – an outcome of domestic disunity – not only impeded the facilitation of the referendum’s outcome but even more launched a short-lived period of crisis. 
It was further demonstrated how the different levels of analysis in the decision making process interact with each other. In this context, the way this latter group has interacted with regional (and international) elements to use military means to solve a political dispute was also analysed. The different factors that have impacted on the post referendum policy making were chronologically analysed and it was explained how this referendum initiative can be examined through the foreign policy analysis. A series of structural – as these stem from each level of analysis – (ideational and material) determinants were presented, including the role of power-politics domestically (inter and intra party), other internal and external developments in addition to cognitive biases that have formed the impact of the referendum results on the formulation of the KR’s policies. The latter continued to remain impactful despite the domestic and external negation of the referendum’s result. Possibly the status of certain disputed territories – still pending – appears to be the foundation of the non-implementation of the referendum’s results, so arguably the will of the central government always plays a critical role (as the Sudanese example demonstrated). This paper has also included the role of the agreements in this process and how policy making is dependent on the implementation of binding (cover or overt) legal agreements.  
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^1	  “In 2016… [a] monumental event occurred…the referendum by the British electorate to leave the European Union (EU)”.
^2	  “The year 2014 with the rise of IS was a turning point that pushed towards an independence referendum”. 
^3	  This paper’s argument is in line with Frank A Stengel and Rainer Baumann according to whom “foreign policy needs to take account of the growing importance of non-state actors”.
^4	  “E.g. the cutting of the federal budget to the KRG or the non-formation of the Federation Council constitutes examples of these violations”.
^5	  “Referendums on borders are relatively uncommon— or rather, they have become rare. It used to be the case that most ethno national referendums concerned the drawing of borders. This was certainly the case before World War I. Since then right-sizing referendums have become rare. The reasons for this are manifold. One of the reasons is that borders have become fixed”.  
^6	  “Of the 56 referendums on independence since 1860, 50 have been held after 1944. But the vast majority of these (39 in total) were held after 1990”.
^7	  “The referendum may also be initiated i.e. by the president or a parliamentary minority”. 
^8	  “a) Secessionist Referenda happening following the lift of a long-standing imperial hegemony; b) Right sizing referenda happening in the wake of a major conflict or a regime change”. 
^9	  The goal was ‘the US [to] respect Taiwan and China would not act like a bully’.
^10	  “The reaction to any Referendum is an ad hoc case and determinant but also subject to different manners”. 
^11	  “Federalism or any other form of power sharing implies distributing rather than concentrating political authority”.
^12	  This referendum was unilaterally by the Autonomous Region of Catalonia based on the 2012 mandate to hold a referendum on the question: ‘Should Catalonia be a state and if so whether it should be an independent one?’.
^13	  That is the border-violating coup d’état on October 16, 2017—the night of Kerkuk—led by region’s Shi’a elements (domestic militias and neighbouring armies) both inside and outside Iraq that in coordination with Kurdish opposition forces allied with a certain circle from the Kurdistan Patriotic Union (PUK), was supported by the Iraqi army. Yet, a small group of PUK peshmerga forces stood against this coup.
^14	  Literature on the Record of the process of the Referendum.
^15	   “The Iraqi 2019 budget bill dedicates 50 billion Iraqi dinar ($42 million) for reopening Article 140 offices in Kirkuk and Nineveh and an additional 800 billion dinar ($672 million) for implementation of the article”.
^16	  “The issue of the disputed areas and in particular Kirkuk is not just a local issue but a regional and international problem”.
^17	  Massoud Barzani said (on July 3, 2014) that he no longer felt bound by the Iraqi constitution, which enshrines the unity of the state, and asked the parliament (of Kurdistan) to start preparations for a vote on the right for self-determination.
^18	  “The parliament was set to reconvene on September 15, 2017 for the first time in two years’ following a parliamentary crisis ‘with the Kurdish referendum at the top of the agenda’”.
^19	  “Preserving Iraq’s territorial integrity and political unity is one of the fundamental principles of Turkey’s Iraq policy”. 
^20	  Al Abadi was replacing al Maliki as early as September 2014.
^21	  According to Massoud Barzani, “the decision to hold the referendum was postponed due to the rise of the Islamic State in the same year”.
^22	  “The commander of Al Quds force was instrumental in retaking Kirkuk”.
^23	  “Based on: Article 117(1) Iraqi Law between 1992 and 2003 all decisions taken in KR haven been institutionalised and as such accepted”. 
^24	  “Currently, 67 percent of automobile imports to the Kurdistan Region are brought through the Iranian border. There are 359 Iranian companies and 135 Iranian factories in the Kurdistan Region”.
^25	  That is the border-violating coup d’état on October 16, 2017—the night of Kerkuk—led by region’s Shi’a elements both inside and outside Iraq that in coordination with Kurdish opposition forces (a certain circle from the PUK), was supported by the Iraqi army. Yet, a small group of PUK peshmerga forces stood against.
^26	  “14 brigades have been merged under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs and there is law in the parliament according to which all financial sources will go under the ministry. Thus there will be no financial issues connected to these forces”.
^27	  Cases like Quebec’s referendums are indicative of the fact that despite referenda’s outcome still discussion and political negotiations other than the use of military force can constitute pillars of peaceful co-existence. Despite thus two successive referendums, including the adoption of a new constitution and two rounds of constitutional negotiations, the aftermath of the 1995 referendum resulted in failed constitutional talks that rendered constitutional amendments undesirable in François Rocher, “Self-determination and in the use of referendums: the case of Quebec”, International Journal of Politics Culture and Society, Vol.27, No1, (Springer 2013), pp. 33-34, 43. 
^28	  “It was a long week…during which we would go to Kirkuk [and] the decision was to defend”.
^29	  “Popular Mobilisation Units deployment plan to attack the Gwer-Dibege-Dibid road connecting Mosul to Kirkuk”.
^30	  “Hash-Al Shaab and Hezbollah took part and the US had all details of that”.
^31	  “Kurdistanis like people of other nations vary by dialect, region and religion” in Brendan O’Leary, John McGarry and Khaled Salih, The future of Kurdistan in Iraq, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005, p.22.
^32	  “Weber distinguishes between three kinds of authority: the traditional – based on upon history and custom; the charismatic- the power of the personality; legal/rational authority derived from the formal powers of a post”.
^33	  “The emphasis on individual decision makers in FPA led scholars to focus on psychological and cognitive factors as explanatory sources of foreign policy choice”.
^34	  In this case – and in opposition to Hudson – I view as a starting point for change both the individuals and the structures. The relation between structural constraints and actions of agents does not necessarily have to be always inter-linked.
